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CONTINUING EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE SENTENCING LAWS
Misty Wilson Borkowski*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has historically been more adaptable
to “evolving standards of decency”1 than state courts have, perhaps because
the nature of its jurisdiction better positions the Court to have its finger on
the national pulse. One indicator of the Court’s adaptability has been its
willingness to consider novel scientific findings in reaching its decisions.
For example, in Brown v. Board of Education, the Court relied on the findings of numerous psychologists and psychiatrists to determine that segregation has a detrimental psychological effect upon African American school
children.2 Obviously, many state courts across the country opposed the ruling, maybe in symbolic opposition to centralized federal power (that old
“States’ Rights” song and dance) or, maybe, because those states were slower to embrace the scientific findings relied on by the Court. Some combination of both most likely played a role in the states’ opposition.
The modern Court has been no less adaptable, as evidenced by recent
reforms to juvenile sentencing law.3 However, as was the case with Brown,
state courts have been reluctant to follow suit. As a result, state courts have
been able to subvert the Supreme Court by way of the de facto life sentences. These de facto life sentences run counter to the character and spirit of the
Supreme Court’s juvenile sentencing reforms and the Court should issue a
ruling to cure the subversion tactics.
This article sets out these recent juvenile sentencing reforms as case
studies of the Court’s adaptability as well as the effect that innovations and
new findings in the mental health field have had on the Court’s reasoning.
*

Misty Wilson Borkowski is a Director with Cross, Gunter, Witherspoon & Galchus, P.C.,
an employment and labor law defense firm where the majority of her practice focuses on
immigration law. However, she is also a C.J.A. Attorney appointed to represent federal criminal defendants in the Eastern District of Arkansas and is often appointed by the Arkansas
appellate courts to represent indigent criminal defendants on appeals to the Arkansas Court of
Appeals and Supreme Court. A very special thanks and huge indebtedness is owed to Tucker
M. Brackins, who while working as a CGWG law clerk was essential in writing this law
review article.
1. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 469 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.
48, 58 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561 (2005).
2. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954) (citing to numerous articles
and studies regarding the psychological effects of racial segregation).
3. See infra Part III.
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Part II of this article provides a brief, general history of juvenile sentencing
law in the United States.4 Part III focuses on modern reforms to juvenile law
with respect to capital punishment, life without parole for non-homicide
offenders, and life without parole for homicide defenders.5 Part III also addresses the seminal cases in each of these areas, and examines the way those
cases have been applied (or not applied) by the states, focusing on Arkansas
in particular.6 Last, Part IV argues that the United States Supreme Court
should issue a new ruling to prohibit the practice of de facto life sentencing.7
II. BACKGROUND
This section focuses on the law with respect to sentencing juvenile offenders. It briefly covers the history of juvenile sentencing before discussing
modern reforms and the seminal cases that shaped today’s standards. This
section also discusses the way those reforms have played out in Arkansas
and other states.
Drawing a line between juvenile and adult offenders has been a part of
the modern legal system for nearly 250 years.8 However, for much of U.S.
history, children between the ages of seven and eighteen were virtually
treated as adults.9 Consider the example of James Arcene, a local case.10
Arcene, a Cherokee, was hanged in Fort Smith in 1885 for participating in a
murder when he was ten years old.11
These standards evolved through the nineteenth century. This is when
the first set of reforms in modern juvenile treatment arose—the establishment of juvenile courts.12 In the early twentieth century, the United States
Children’s Bureau recommended an age limit of eighteen for juvenile state
courts.13 Because “it was felt at the outset that . . . the new [juvenile court]
system would help rather than punish juvenile defendants,” the new system
did not provide the same due process rights to juveniles as the regular court
4. See infra Part II.
5. See infra Part III.
6. See infra Part III.
7. See infra Part IV.
8. See Scott Lenahan, A New Era in Juvenile Justice: Expanding the Scope of Juvenile
Protections Through Neuropsychology, 20 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 92, 94 (2014).
9. Id.; See also Kimberly Larson et. al., Miller v. Alabama: Implications for Forensic
Mental Health Assessment at the Intersection of Social Science and the Law, 39 NEW ENG. J.
ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 319, 320 (2013).
10. See Rob Warden & Daniel Lennard, Death in American Under Color of Law: Our
Long, Inglorious Experience with Capital Punishment, 13 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 194, 214
(2018).
11. Id.
12. Lenahan, supra note 8, at 94.
13. Lenahan, supra note 8, at 94.
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system did to adults.14 By the 1960s, the Supreme Court had begun building
up juvenile due process, culminating with In re Gault.15 In re Gault marked
a turning point in juvenile jurisprudence, recognizing the differences between juvenile and adult culpability as well as inserting due process rights
that were originally left out of many juvenile court systems around the country.16 The Court was largely silent on the issue of juvenile due process for
the next thirty or forty years until, in the 1990s, “widespread public perception of a juvenile crime wave led to legislative and other changes that resulted in youth being treated more harshly both within the juvenile and adult
[court] systems.”17
III. MODERN REFORMS
A.

Capital Punishment

One of the first major juvenile sentencing issues taken up by the Court
was capital punishment. In Roper v. Simmons, the question of whether an
individual could be executed for capital crimes committed under the age of
eighteen landed squarely before the Court.18 In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme
Court held that execution of juvenile homicide offenders is prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment.19
Specifically, the Court addressed whether a juvenile who committed a
capital crime between the ages of fifteen and eighteen could be executed,20 a
question it had answered in the affirmative about sixteen years earlier in
Stanford v. Kentucky.21 Between the Stanford decision and Roper, five states
did away with the juvenile death penalty.22 The Court saw this as a significant change, indicating a building national consensus against the juvenile
death penalty.23
The Roper Court ultimately held that a juvenile could not be sentenced
to death for a capital crime, basing its decision in part on the fact that “differences between juvenile and adult offenders are too marked and well un14. Larson, supra note 9, at 321.
15. Id. at 322.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 543 U.S. 551, 555–56 (2005).
19. Id. at 578.
20. Id. at 555–56.
21. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989). Interestingly, in a plurality
opinion from the previous year, the Court found that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the
execution of any offender “under 16 years of age at the time of his or her offense.” Thompson
v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988).
22. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 565 (2005).
23. Id. at 565–66.
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derstood to risk allowing a youthful person to receive the death penalty despite insufficient culpability.”24 Specifically, the Court focused on three general differences:25 first, “[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are more
understandable among the young. These qualities often result in impetuous
and ill-considered actions and decision;”26 second, “[j]uveniles are more
vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure;”27 and third, “the character of a juvenile is not as well
formed as that of an adult. The personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed.”28 “From a moral standpoint it would be misguided to
equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility
exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will be reformed.”29
The Court noted that these are general differences that “any parent
knows,”30 but also based its reasoning on the “scientific and sociological
studies respondent and his amici cite[d] . . . .”31 Those amici included briefs
from numerous medical and social organizations, including the American
Psychological Association and the American Medical Association.32
The Roper court noted that the Thompson court relied on many of these
same factors in determining that juvenile offenders under the age of sixteen
were not eligible for the death penalty, and incorporated that reasoning to
hold that the same logic applied to all juvenile offenders under eighteen.33 In
addressing what would become one of the major concerns of those that oppose the rule set out in Roper, the Court reasoned that a categorical ban on
juvenile death penalties was necessary precisely because “[i]t is difficult
even for expert psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender
whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.”34
The petitioners raised this uncertainty as an argument against a categorical ban.35 What if a juvenile actually is mature enough and depraved
24. Id. at 572–73 (emphasis added).
25. Id. at 569.
26. Id.
27. Id. (citing Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350 (1993)).
28. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 569.
31. Id.
32. See Brief for American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1636447; see Brief for
American Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1633549.
33. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570–71.
34. Id. at 573.
35. Id. at 572.

2019]

EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE SENTENCING LAWS

75

enough to warrant the death penalty? Should not a jury determine whether
an offender has exhibited diminished culpability? Again, the Court reasoned
that the “differences between juvenile and adult offenders are too marked”
to allow a jury to decide the matter.36
In short, the Court decided that, because some juvenile offenders are
less mature (and therefore less culpable) than adults, no juvenile offenders
could lawfully be executed.37 Objecting to this categorical rule, Justice
O’Connor inverted the Court’s logic, arguing that because some juvenile
offenders are as mature as adults (and therefore sufficiently culpable), juries
should be able to decide their fate.38
B.

Life Without Parole for Non-Homicide Offenses

Five years after the Court decided Roper, the Court took up the issue of
life without parole sentences for juveniles, specifically, for non-homicide
offenses. In Graham v. Florida, the Court held that juvenile, non-homicide
offenders were not eligible for life without parole sentences under the
Eighth Amendment.39 In Graham, the defendant committed the crimes for
which he was sentenced at the age of seventeen and was sentenced at age
nineteen.40 Graham marked the first time that the Supreme Court considered
a categorical ban to a term-of-years sentence.41
Beginning its analysis with “objective indicia of national consensus,”
the Court determined that such a consensus had developed against the sentencing practice of life without parole for juvenile non-homicide offenders.42
The Court focused on and compared jurisdictions in countries that do and do
not allow life without parole for non-homicide juvenile offenders in reaching this determination.43
The Court’s second analytical step required it to consider “the culpability of the offenders at issue in light of their crimes and characteristics, along
with the severity of the punishment in question.”44 As far as culpability goes,
the Court incorporated the same reasoning that the Roper court relied on.45
36. Id.
37. Id. at 573–74
38. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 587–607 (O’Connor, J. dissenting).
39. 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010).
40. Id. at 58.
41. Id. at 61.
42. Id. at 62–67.
43. Id. at 62 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002)) (“The clearest and
most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the
country’s legislatures.”).
44. Id. at 67.
45. Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 (“No recent data provide reason to reconsider the Court’s
observations in Roper about the nature of juveniles.”).
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Again, the Court pointed to research from the American Medical Association and the American Psychological Association to back its determination
of diminished culpability of juveniles.46 Specifically, the Court noted that
“developments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds,” citing the American Medical Association’s amicus brief and its showing that behavioral control centers in the brain continue maturing through late adolescence.47
The Court’s determination that juvenile offenders are less culpable informed its reasoning that a sentence of life without parole for non-homicide
juvenile offenders cannot be justified by any legitimate penological reasons
(retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation).48 Importantly, the
Court noted that “while the Eighth Amendment prohibits a State from imposing a life without parole sentence on a juvenile non-homicide offender, it
does not require the State to release that offender during his natural life.”49
Finally, as in Roper, the Court observed sentencing practices around
the world for “support for its independent conclusion that a particular punishment is cruel and unusual.”50 It should be noted that Chief Justice Roberts, in his concurring opinion, disapproved of incorporating Roper’s reasoning into Graham to support a categorical rule proscribing life without parole
for non-homicide, juvenile offenders.51 However, Chief Justice Roberts did
value Roper for its conclusions that juveniles have diminished culpability.52
Rather than adopting a new categorical ban on life sentences without parole
for non-homicide, juvenile offenders, Chief Justice Roberts would have preferred the Court applied Roper’s conclusions to the Court’s existing, casespecific analysis.53
C.

Life Without Parole for Homicide Offenses

Where the Graham court left open the question of juvenile life without
parole for homicide offenders, the Court answered this question in 2012.54
Miller v. Alabama reaffirmed the reasoning of both Roper and Graham,
finding that the differences between adults and juveniles “both lessened a
child’s ‘moral culpability’ and enhanced the prospect that, as the years go by

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Larson, supra note 9, at 327.
Graham, 560 U.S. at 68.
Id. at 71–75.
Id. at 75.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 89–90 (Roberts, C.J. concurring).
Id.
Graham, 560 U.S. at 89–90.
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012).
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and neurological development occurs, his ‘deficiencies will be reformed.’”55
The Court recognized that Roper and Graham were limited in scope to juvenile capital punishment and life without parole for non-homicide juvenile
offenders, respectively, but it concluded that “Graham’s reasoning implicates any life without parole sentence imposed on a juvenile, even as its
categorical bar relates only to non-homicide offenses.”56
At first glance, Miller seems to proscribe the imposition of life without
parole on juvenile homicide offenders entirely. However, Miller is slightly
more nuanced than Graham because the Court held that “the mandatorysentencing scheme[]” of life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders
violated the Eighth Amendment.57 That is, the Court did not categorically
ban life without parole for such offenders, but rather the Court imposed a
requirement that the sentence “take into account how children are different,
and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a
lifetime in prison.”58
The Court took issue with the fact that the mandatory sentencing
scheme does not enable the sentence to consider a juvenile’s age as a mitigating factor.59 The Court listed as the “hallmark features” of a juvenile offender’s age: “immaturity, impetuosity and failure to appreciate risks and
consequences.”60
D.

Juvenile Sentencing in Arkansas

This section discusses the way in which the modern iterations of juvenile sentencing law have manifested in the Arkansas court system. It focuses
both on cases that have resulted in reversals and vacated sentences as well as
those that have remained unaffected by the trio of Supreme Court holdings.
In this way, this section shows that Arkansas (as well as other states) takes
advantage of a “loophole” of sorts in the form of de facto life sentences
without parole for juvenile offenders (homicide and non-homicide alike).
1.

Jackson v. Norris

Jackson v. Norris was originally a companion case to Miller, and the
way the Arkansas Supreme Court handled the case on remand from the Su55. Id. at 472.
56. Id. at 473 (emphasis added). See also id. (“Most fundamentally, Graham insists that
youth matters in determining the appropriateness of a lifetime of incarceration without the
possibility of parole.”).
57. Id. at 489.
58. Id. at 479–480.
59. Id. at 477–478.
60. Miller 567 U.S. at 477.
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preme Court is particularly important.61 Kuntrell Jackson was convicted of
capital murder and aggravated robbery for crimes he committed as a fourteen-year-old.62 Pursuant to the Arkansas sentencing scheme at the time,
Jackson’s capital murder conviction carried a mandatory sentence of life
imprisonment.63 The Arkansas Supreme Court took up the issue of Jackson’s
sentence after the United States Supreme Court held that the Arkansas sentencing scheme violated the Eighth Amendment in Miller.
Unsurprisingly, the Arkansas court reversed the original denial of Jackson’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, but the court still had to remand the
case to the original sentencing court, and it had to decide what instructions
to give that court.64 The Arkansas Supreme Court instructed the circuit court
to hold a new sentencing hearing “where Jackson [could] present for consideration evidence that would include his ‘age, age-related characteristics, and
the nature of his crime.’”65 The circuit court was also instructed to sentence
Jackson to a term-of-years between ten and forty years, or life, as the Arkansas Supreme Court determined that juvenile homicide offenses would be
sentenced in accordance with Class Y felonies.66
Although Jackson continued to argue that he could not be sentenced to
life under the Eighth Amendment (pursuant to Miller), the court disagreed,
reasoning that a Class Y felony did not mandate a sentence of life imprisonment, and that the sentencing court would be required to consider Jackson’s age.67
2.

Hale v. Hobbs

Bobby Ray Hale pleaded guilty to a count of first-degree murder for
crimes he committed in October of 1977.68 He was sixteen years old when
he committed the crimes.69 Hale received a sentence of life imprisonment for
the first-degree murder charge, as well as a life sentence for aggravated robbery charges and a twenty-year sentence for battery.70 In 2013, Hale filed a
writ of habeas corpus, arguing (in part) that “his life sentences for both aggravated robbery and first-degree murder were unconstitutional because he

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See Jackson v. Norris, 2013 Ark. 175, 426 S.W.3d 906.
Id., at 1, 426 S.W.3d at 907.
Id., at 2, 426 S.W.3d at 907.
Id., 426 S.W.3d at 907.
Id., 426 S.W.3d at 907 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570).
Id., 426 S.W.3d at 907.
Jackson, 2013 Ark. 175, at 9, 426 S.W.3d at 911.
Hale v. Hobbs, 2014 Ark. 405, at 1, 443 S.W.3d 533, 533.
Id., at 1 n.1, 443 S.W.3d at 533 n.1.
Id., at 1–2, 443 S.W.3d at 533–34.
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was a juvenile when he received them.”71 The Lee County Circuit Court
denied Hale’s petition on May 1, 2013.72
On appeal, Hale argued that his four sentences to life without parole for
the aggravated robbery (i.e. non-homicide) charges violated the Eighth
Amendment under the Supreme Court’s ruling in Graham.73 He also argued
that his life sentence for the homicide charge violated the Eighth Amendment under Miller.74 The court did not reach Hale’s Graham or Miller argument, though, finding instead that the Pulaski County Circuit Court (the
court that originally sentenced Hale) “exceeded its statutory authority by
sentencing Hale to terms of imprisonment of life with the possibility of parole . . . .”75
3.

Hobbs v. Turner

Hobbs v. Turner is curious in that it represents a case where the state
court rejected state officials’ attempts to create a loophole through the Graham decision.76 In Turner, the offender was sentenced to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole for a kidnapping he committed when he
was under the age of eighteen.77 Following the Graham decision, Turner
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his sentence was
unconstitutional.78
Interestingly, the State conceded that the Turner’s sentence was unconstitutional, but not because of its duration; rather, because Turner was not
eligible for parole.79 Turner argued that his sentence should be reduced to
between ten and forty years, while the State argued that the court should
sever the parole statute and that Turner’s sentence should remain a life sentence.80
The circuit court determined that it could not sever the parole statute
without violating Arkansas sentencing statutes and thus sentenced Turner to
forty years.81 In doing so, the circuit court found that the original sentencing
court intended to sentence Turner to the maximum sentence available for

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id., at 2–3, 443 S.W.3d at 534.
Id., at 3, 443 S.W.3d at 534.
Id., 443 S.W.3d at 534.
Hale, 2014 Ark. 405, at 3, 443 S.W.3d at 534.
Id., at 5, 443 S.W.3d at 535.
See Hobbs v. Turner, 2014 Ark. 19, 431 S.W.3d 283.
Id., at 1, 431 S.W.3d. at 284.
Id., at 2, 431 S.W.3d at 284.
Id., at 2–3, 431 S.W.3d at 284–85.
Id., at 3, 431 S.W.3d at 285.
Id., at 4, 431 S.W.3d at 285.
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kidnapping.82 This informed the court’s reasoning for the forty-year sentence.83
The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s ruling and set
out an important rule for similar subsequent cases. The court held that
“Graham does not mandate a resentencing procedure that takes into account
a juvenile offenders age.”84 According to the court, Turner’s “youth at the
time of his offense and evidence concerning what brain science and psychology have to say about youthful offenders [had] already been taken into
account through his categorical exemption from an otherwise legislatively
authorized life-without-parole sentence under Graham.”85
4.

Bramlett v. Hobbs

Bramlett v. Hobbs provides an example of Graham working to commute a sentence of life without parole.86 In 1979, Steven Wayne Bramlett
was sentenced to life imprisonment for an attempted capital murder he
committed when he was seventeen years old.87 Bramlett filed a complaint
for declaratory relief in 2011, arguing that, under Graham, his life sentence
was unconstitutional.88
The circuit court, in granting the State’s motion for summary judgment,
held that attempted capital murder should be categorized as a “homicide
offense” and therefore Graham did not apply.89 The Arkansas Supreme
Court reversed, holding that attempted capital murder is not a homicide offense, as it does not result in the death of another individual.90 Accordingly,
the case was remanded to the circuit court in order for Bramlett to be resentenced to a term of years.91
5.

Proctor v. Kelley

Despite the categorical rule set forth in Graham, and despite that case’s
effectiveness in overturning sentences in some cases (as evidenced by
Bramlett), Arkansas courts have still found a way around even its least ambiguous rule.92 In 1982, Terrance Proctor, age seventeen, committed a num82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Hobbs, 2014 Ark. 19, at 4, 431 S.W.3d at 285.
Id., 431 S.W.3d at 285.
Id., at 11, 431 S.W.3d at 289.
Id., at 13–14, 431 S.W.3d at 290.
See Bramlett v. Hobbs, 2015 Ark. 146, at 1, 463 S.W.3d 283.
Id.
Id., at 2, 463 S.W.3d at 284.
Id., at 5, 463 S.W.3d at 286.
Id., at 5–8, 463 S.W.3d at 286–288.
Id., at 10, 463 S.W.3d at 288–89.
See Proctor v. Kelley, 2018 Ark. 382, 562 S.W.3d 837.
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ber of robberies.93 In 1983, he pleaded guilty to eleven different counts, both
for aggravated robbery and for robbery.94 The Pulaski County Circuit Court
sentenced Proctor to life imprisonment for one of the aggravated robberies
and 200 years imprisonment for his other counts.95
Proctor first petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus following the Graham decision in 2014.96 His writ was granted and his life sentence was reduced to forty years.97 However, Proctor’s sentences were ordered to run
consecutively, so he was effectively sentenced to 240 years imprisonment.98
Proctor again requested a writ of habeas corpus in 2017, arguing that
“the 240-year sentence he is now serving is a de facto life sentence in violation of the holding of Graham.”99 Importantly, Proctor acknowledged that he
would be eligible for parole, but not until he was eighty-seven years old.100
Proctor argued that, because his life expectancy fell short of eighty-seven
years, his sentence offered no “meaningful opportunity for release as required by Graham.”101
The parties presented the court with two options: “extend Graham to
prohibit sentences for juveniles when the cumulative time to serve before
parole eligibility exceeds the individual’s life expectancy” or do not extend
Graham because it “applies only to life-without-parole sentences imposed
for non-homicide offenses.”102 The court chose to read Graham narrowly,
distinguishing it from Proctor’s case in several ways.103 In finding that Graham did not apply to Proctor’s case, the court pointed to the fact that Proctor
was subject to multiple sentences (“any one of which would not amount to a
life sentence”) for multiple offenses, whereas Graham was sentenced for a
single non-homicide offense.104
Justice Josephine Hart wrote a concurring opinion in which she agreed
that the court applied the current law correctly, but she opined that the law’s
current application runs counter to the character of the Supreme Court’s

93. Id., at 1, 562 S.W.3d at 839.
94. Id., 562 S.W.3d at 839.
95. Id., at 1–2, 562 S.W.3d at 839.
96. Id., at 2, 562 S.W.3d at 839.
97. Id., 562 S.W.3d at 839. (“The circuit court concluded that, pursuant to our decision
in Hobbs v. Turner, 2014 Ark. 19, 431 S.W.3d 283, the remedy for a Graham violation is to
reduce the petitioner’s life sentence to the maximum term-of-years sentence available for the
crime at the time it was committed.”).
98. Proctor, 2018 Ark. 382, at 2, 562 S.W.3d at 839.
99. Id., 562 S.W.3d at 839.
100. Id., at 4, 562 S.W.3d at 840.
101. Id., at 4–5, 562 S.W.3d at 840.
102. Id., at 6, 562 S.W.3d at 841.
103. See id., at 6–7, 562 S.W.3d at 841–42.
104. Proctor, 2018 Ark. 382, at 6–7, 562 S.W.3d at 841–42.
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decisions in Graham and Miller.105 Justice Hart, relying on Roper, Graham,
and Miller, reasoned that Proctor’s sentence was unconstitutional.106 While
she acknowledged that the Arkansas court properly followed precedent, Justice Hart argued that doing so could mean putting Arkansas “on the wrong
side of history.”107
6.

Early v. Kelley

In Early v. Kelley, the petitioner asserted claims under both Graham
and Miller, but his Miller argument was abandoned on appeal.108 Reginald
Early was sentenced to life imprisonment for a first-degree murder and aggravated robbery he committed as a minor.109 While Early did abandon his
Miller argument, the court briefly addressed it, finding that Miller only applied if Early’s life sentence was mandatory.110
Interestingly, the court also found Early’s Graham argument without
merit. Early argued that, under Graham, the life sentence he received for his
aggravated robbery charge—a non-homicide offense—was unconstitutional.111 The court concluded that Graham did not apply to Early’s life sentence
for aggravated robbery because Early also committed a homicide offense.112
Justice Hart dissented.113 She reasoned that Early’s convictions stood
separately and that his sentences for those convictions should have been
treated similarly.114 According to Justice Hart:
[R]ather than scouring Graham for dicta, the majority should have employed the following syllogism. Graham banned life sentences for juvenile offenders who commit nonhomicide offenses. Early committed aggravated robbery as a juvenile and received a life sentence for that crime.
Aggravated robbery is a nonhomicide offense. Therefore, Early’s life
sentence for aggravated robbery is illegal on its face. 115

These cases show that Arkansas courts have been reluctant to expand
the Supreme Court’s decisions in Graham and Miller. This is not to say that
these decisions have been inoperative in the state. In fact, between July 2016
and November 2018, Miller affected at least fifty-eight Arkansas cases in
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id., at 9–13, 562 S.W.3d at 842–45. (Hart, J., concurring).
Id., 562 S.W.3d at 842–45.
Id., at 9–10, 562 S.W.3d at 842–43.
Early v. Kelley, 2018 Ark. 364, at 1–2, 562 S.W.3d 205, 206.
Id., at 1, 562 S.W.3d at 206.
Id., at 2, 562 S.W.3d at 206–07.
Id., at 1, 562 S.W.3d at 206.
Id., at 2, 562 S.W.3d at 207.
Id., at 3–4, 562 S.W.3d at 207–208.
Early, 2018 Ark. 364, at 3–4, 562 S.W.3d at 207–208. (Hart, J., dissenting).
Id., at 4, 562 S.W.3d at 208.
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which an individual was sentenced for committing capital murder as a minor. A large number of those cases have resulted in life without parole sentences being reduced to forty year sentences,116 forty years being the maximum term of years for a Class Y felony under Arkansas law.117 A smaller
number of Arkansas cases have seen life sentences reduced to fewer than
forty years.118 In some even more rare instances, where a reduced sentence
was combined with time served, Miller resulted in the release of inmates
from state custody.119 However, despite the apparent success of Miller in
Arkansas, it is important to remember that nearly eight years after the decision, a large number of cases remain unresolved. The broader takeaway is
that Arkansas is still reluctant to expand (or even apply) Graham and Miller,
and it may be using delay tactics to avoid doing so.
E.

Juvenile Sentencing in Other States

Arkansas is not the only state that has construed the Supreme Court’s
juvenile sentencing reform cases narrowly, a fact Justice Courtney Goodson

116. See Nunc Pro Tunc Amended Sentencing Order, State v. Brandon Isbell (No. 01CR94-273) (Oct. 25, 2018); Nunc Pro Tunc Amended Sentencing Order, State v. William Paul
Smith (No. 60CR-89-2371) (Aug. 9, 2018); Nunc Pro Tunc Amended Sentencing Order,
State v. Wallace Allen (No. 60CR-97-2911) (July 12, 2018); Nunc Pro Tunc Amended Sentencing Order, State v. Charles Jackson (No. 60CR-89-1723) (July 2, 2018); Nunc Pro Tunc
Amended Sentencing Order, State v. Mervin Jenkins (No. 60CR-98-1416) (June 26, 2018);
Sentencing Order, State v. Tyrone Duncan (No. 60CR-98-3414) (June 25, 2018); Order to
Reduce Sentence, State v. Damarcus Jordan (No. 60CR-01-1084) (June 21, 2018); Order to
Reduce Sentence, State v. Brandon Hardman (No. 60CR-00-1457) (June 20, 2018); Sentencing Order, State v. Dheaslee Wright (No. 47BCR-96-387) (Sept. 1, 2017); Sentencing Order,
State v. Julius Yankaway (No. 47CR-02-224) (July 26, 2017); Amended Sentencing Order,
State v. Richard Hill (No. 52CR-97-216) (June 14, 2017); Amended Sentencing Order, State
v. William Davis (No. 14CR-00-38) (June 8, 2017); Sentencing Order, State v. Seanell Moore
(No. 35CR-94-462A) (Feb. 27, 2017); Sentencing Order, State v. Benjamin McFarland (No.
05CR-96-300) (Jan. 18, 2017); Sentencing Order, State v. Kevin Lloyd (No. 58CR-95-511)
(Nov. 16, 2016); Order to Reduce Sentence, State v. Detric Franklin (No. 60CR-91-1995)
(Sep. 12, 2016).
117. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-401(a)(1) (Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.).
118. See Nunc Pro Tunc Amended Sentencing Order, State v. Lemuel Whiteside (No.
60CR-09-1183) (Nov. 13, 2018) (sentence reduced to ten years); Nunc Pro Tunc Amended
Sentencing Order, State v. Edward Little (No. 60CR-80-1104) (Oct. 12, 2018) (sentence
reduced to twenty years); Nunc Pro Tunc Amended Sentencing Order, State v. Prince Johnson (No. 60CR-90-1307) (Aug. 9, 2018) (sentence reduced to thirty-five years); Sentencing
Order, State v. Derrick Shields (No. 47BCR-01-107) (Oct. 20, 2017) (sentence reduced to
twenty-eight years); Sentencing Order, State v. Brandon Flowers (No. 35CR-98-559C) (Feb.
8, 2017) (sentence reduced to twenty-five years); Nunc Pro Tunc Amended Sentencing Order, State v. Nakia Davis (No. 35CR-93-541B) (Jan. 20, 2017) (sentence reduced to twentyfive years).
119. See e.g. Order, State v. Dennis Lewis (No. 72CR-74-96) (Oct. 25, 2016).
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pointed out in Proctor.120 Virginia and Colorado also provide clear examples
of state supreme courts refusing to extend the holdings.
1.

Vasquez v. Commonwealth

In Vasquez v. Commonwealth, two Virginia defendants were convicted
of numerous felonies for crimes they committed at the age of sixteen.121 The
aggregate sentences of each, after accounting for their suspended sentences,
were 133 years and 68 years, respectively.122 Both men argued that their
sentences violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment and urged the court to expand Graham to “non-life sentences that, when aggregated, exceed the normal life spans of juvenile offenders.”123 Relying in part on Justice Alito’s dissent in Graham, the Supreme Court of Virginia declined, holding that Graham applied solely to life
without parole sentences for non-homicide juvenile offenders.124
2.

Lucero v. People

The Colorado Supreme Court has reached a similar conclusion.125 In
Lucero v. People, the petitioner was convicted of a number of non-homicide
offenses in connection with a drive-by shooting.126 His sentences, in the aggregate, amounted to eighty-four years.127 Following the Graham decision,
Lucero appealed his sentence, arguing that it amounted to a sentence of life
without parole.128 The trial court denied Lucero’s motion and the court of
appeals affirmed, holding that the sentence was constitutional under Graham and Miller.129 The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals ruling, but not because Lucero’s sentence satisfied Graham or Miller.130 Instead, the court held that neither of those cases applied to an aggregate term-of-years sentence.131 By the court’s logic, “the U.S Supreme Court
held unconstitutional a life without parole sentence imposed on a juvenile
for a single nonhomicide offense,” “[l]ife without parole is a specific sentence, distinct from sentences to terms of years,” “Lucero was not sentenced
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

2018 Ark. 382, at 7, 562 S.W.3d at 841.
781 S.E.2d 920, 922 (2016).
Id. at 924.
Id. at 925.
Id.
See Lucero v. People, 349 P.3d 1128, 1134.
Id., 349 P.3d at 1129.
Id.
Id., 349 P.3d at 1129.
Id., 349 P.3d at 1129.
Id., 349 P.3d at 1130.
Lucero, 349 P.3d at 1130.
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to life without parole,” “[t]herefore, Graham and Miller [were] inapplicable
to, and thus do not invalidate, Lucero’s aggregate sentence.”132
IV. ARGUMENT
This section argues that the United States Supreme Court should issue
a new ruling that prohibits de facto life sentences. After a brief discussion of
the “spirit” of the Supreme Court’s juvenile sentencing jurisprudence, this
section discusses problems with the current application of Graham as well
as problems with the proposed rule of barring terms-of-years sentences
based on life expectancy. Finally, this section proposes a method for rectifying the loopholes left open by the Graham decision while reconciling that
method with concerns raised by state courts that have chosen to read Graham narrowly.
A.

The “Spirit” of Roper, Graham, and Miller

Before pointing out problems with the way juvenile sentencing law is
currently applied, a clearer picture of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in the
three major juvenile sentencing cases is necessary.133 The linchpin of the
Court’s reasoning in Roper,134 Graham,135 and Miller136 was the diminished
culpability of a juvenile. The Court was willing to view evidence presented
by various scientific associations regarding the mental development of minors and was willing to use that evidence in concluding that minors could
not be held to the same culpability standard as adults.
A number of courts have taken the “spirit of the trilogy” to mean that
they are required to read Graham much more broadly than those discussed
in the previous section. For example, in Johnson v. State, the Florida Supreme Court held that a petitioner’s one-hundred year sentence most likely
exceeded his life span and did not “provide him a meaningful opportunity
for early release . . . .”137 Interestingly, the petitioner was originally sentenced to six back-to-back life sentences, but those were set aside by the
trial court on the petitioner’s request following the Graham decision.138 In
132. Id.
133. Some have called this the “spirit of the trilogy,” referring to the three seminal juvenile sentencing cases, and that term is used throughout this section. See generally Daniel
Jones, Note, Technical Difficulties: Why a Broader Reading of Graham and Miller Should
Prohibit De Facto Life Without Parole Sentences for Juvenile Offenders, 90 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 169, 171 (2016).
134. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S 551, 565–573 (2005).
135. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 67–68 (2010).
136. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 472 (2012).
137. 215 So. 3d 1237, 1244 (2017).
138. Id. at 1239.
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holding that Graham also applied to (and barred) the petitioner’s onehundred year sentence, the Florida Supreme Court focused not “on the
length of the sentence imposed, but the status of the offender and the possibility that he or she [would] grow into a contributing member of society.”139
According to the Florida court, Graham operated to create a “special class
of citizens . . . juvenile nonhomicide offenders,”140 a broader reading than
just applying Graham to the specific life-without-parole sentence.
Courts like the Johnson court have recognized that the “spirit of the
trilogy” means more than just prohibiting the specific sentences those cases
involved;141 it means treating cases of juvenile offenders in a measured, factspecific way. Perhaps this meaning is best stated by the Iowa Supreme
Court:
In light of our increased understanding of the decision making of youths,
the sentencing process must be tailored to account in a meaningful way
for the attributes of juveniles that are distinct from adult conduct. At the
core of all of this also lies the profound sense of what a person loses by
beginning to serve a lifetime of incarceration as a youth.
In the end, a government system that resolves disputes could hardly call
itself a system of justice with a rule that demands individualized sentencing considerations common to all youths apply only to those youths facing a sentence of life without parole and not to those youths facing a sentence of life with no parole until age seventy-eight.142

The Johnson decision out of Florida underscores another key aspect of
the “spirit of the trilogy,” one that the diminished culpability of juveniles
informed. The Supreme Court made clear that sentencing a juvenile nonhomicide offender satisfies none of the traditional penological goals.143 “A
sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense,” and the Graham court reasoned a sentence of
life without parole for juvenile non-homicide offenders was so lacking.144
This same lack of justification, as well as the diminished culpability of
juveniles, should operate to bar de facto life sentences for juvenile non139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Jones, supra note 133, at 190 (quoting State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 121 (Iowa
2013) (internal quotations omitted)) (“Courts that employ this approach recognize that the
spirit of the constitutional mandates of Miller and Graham instruct that much more is at stake
in the sentencing of juveniles than merely making sure parole is possible.”).
142. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 121 (emphasis added). The court went on to hold that “Miller applies to sentences that are the functional equivalent of life without parole.” Id. at 121–
22.
143. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71–75 (2010).
144. Id. at 71.
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homicide offenses as well. While the Graham court was careful to limit its
holding to life without parole sentences (a fact that states like Arkansas and
Virginia are quick to point out), de facto life sentences operate just like life
sentences. The “spirit of the trilogy” is, in part, that life sentences are the
“second most severe penalty permitted by law”145 and such sentences are
disproportionately severe as applied to juvenile non-homicide offenders.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should issue a new ruling that prohibits the
practice.
B.

Issues with Graham’s Current Application

The Supreme Court has other reasons than the ideological for issuing a
new ruling with regard to life sentences for non-homicide juvenile offenders. The states need guidance. While the Miller case resolved a number of its
issues, the Graham ruling was unclear on a number of issues, leaving the
door open for opposition states to develop the de facto life sentence loophole.
First, the biggest question left open by the Graham court was, as some
commentators have put it, whether the ruling meant “death is different” or
“kids are different.”146 If Graham meant the latter, a reasoning that the Iowa
Supreme Court adopted,147 then to what else could that reasoning be applied?148 Second, the Graham decision also provided little guidance as to
what a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release”149 entailed. The Supreme
Court imposed this requirement on the states but said little else on the subject. Finally, partly because of Graham’s narrow holding, “what was left
unresolved is the application of the trilogy to de facto life sentences.”150
Another example illustrates just how backwards the current Graham
application operates.151 Say that two juvenile offenders are convicted of a
non-homicide offense in some state that applies Graham narrowly. For
whatever reason (perhaps a court found one offender more culpable than the
other), one offender receives a life without parole sentence, and the other
receives a term-of-years sentence of ninety years. All courts, applying Graham, would find that the first offender had not and would not receive the
“meaningful opportunity for release” required by Graham. Therefore, the
145. Id. at 69.
146. Jones, supra note 133, at 179.
147. State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 119 (Iowa 2013).
148. The Miller court seems to have resolved at least this first question. See Miller v.
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 472 (2012).
149. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 123 (2010).
150. Jones, supra note 133, at 182.
151. This example is borrowed from Jones, supra note 133, at 194, but several figures
have been changed for the sake of simplicity.
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first offender would likely receive a resentencing hearing. However, the
second offender would be out of luck because he or she was not specifically
sentenced to life without parole. Does it make sense that the only offender to
receive a resentencing hearing would be the offender who received the
harsher sentence in the first place?
C.

Issues with Proposed Rules

Petitioners looking to have their sentences reduced under Graham, or
those seeking a resentencing hearing at least, have been fairly consistent in
proposing a rule for applying Graham to aggregate terms-of-years sentences. In Proctor, the petitioner argued that, because he would not be eligible
for parole until the age of eighty-seven, and because his life expectancy fell
short of that number, his sentence amounted to one of life without parole.152
Proctor urged the court to expand Graham to cover scenarios such as his.153
Similarly, the petitioners in Vasquez urged the Virginia Supreme Court to
adopt the same rule, that “non-life sentences that, when aggregated, exceed
the normal life spans of juvenile offenders” are unconstitutional.154
While several jurisdictions have adopted this approach,155 it raises serious issues of practicality. While some cases are (and will be) clearer than
others, it is not easy for a court to determine whether a term-of-years sentence will outlast an offender’s life expectancy. For example, suppose a seventeen-year-old is sentenced to a term-of-years (whether for one offense or
multiple offenses) of seventy years. Ignoring, for the moment, the offender’s
parole eligibility (if any), the offender would not be released until he or she
is eighty-seven. For Graham to apply to this sentence, under the proposed
“life expectancy” rule, a court would have to determine whether that offender would live to be eighty-seven or beyond. This would mean assessing the
offender’s age, race, sex, family background, medical history, etc. That is
hardly a bright-line rule.
D.

A New Juvenile Sentencing Ruling

Undoubtedly, many of the cases, especially those arising out of states
that read Graham narrowly, have been appealed to the Supreme Court.
However, the questions raised by the trilogy remain largely unanswered. A
new ruling clearing up those ambiguities would go far to eliminate the prac152. Proctor v. Kelly, 2018 Ark. 382, at 4–5, 562 S.W.3d 837, 839–840.
153. Id., at 4–5, 562 S.W.3d at 841.
154. Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 781 S.E.2d 920, 925 (2016).
155. See, e.g., United States v. Cobler, 748 F.3d 570, 575–77 (4th Cir. 2014); Johnson v.
State, 215 So. 3d 1237, 1239 (2017); State v. Moore, 76 N.E.3d 1127, 1141 (Ohio 2014);
State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 114–15 (Iowa 2013).
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tice of de facto life sentences for juvenile non-homicide offenders, in compliance with the “spirit of the trilogy.”
However, the Supreme Court should not merely affirm the approach
proffered by the petitioners and courts advocating for the “life expectancy”
rule. Doing so would perpetuate the issues associated with estimating an
individual offender’s life span. Rather, the Supreme Court should issue
guidance to state courts (and possibly state legislatures) in the form of age
limits on terms-of-years sentences for non-homicide juvenile offenders. At
the very least, the offender should be eligible for parole at a certain age,
unrelated to the term of the offender’s actual sentence.
This rule, like any rule, would not be perfect. It is quite possible that
even an age-limited term-of-years could extend beyond an offender’s life
expectancy, but technically any term of imprisonment could extend beyond
an individual’s life expectancy. Tomorrow is promised to no one. But limiting a non-homicide juvenile offender’s sentence to a certain age or requiring
that offender to be eligible for parole by a certain age would provide that
offender with a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”156
V. CONCLUSION
The law is allowed to change. Specifically, the interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment is allowed to change.157 This country no longer subjects
offenders to being tarred and feathered, broken on the rack, stoned, or
hanged. Nor does this country allow juvenile offenders to be put to death,
even for capital offenses.158 The law has been shaped by empirical, scientific
data, as evidenced by the weight the Supreme Court has placed in the medical findings of psychologists and psychiatrists, dating back to the 1950s (at
least).
The Supreme Court has established that juvenile offenders are different
than adult offenders. Accordingly, sentencing schemes for juveniles should
differ from adults. Imposing age limits on the amount of time a nonhomicide juvenile offender may spend incarcerated comports with the “spirit” of the Supreme Court’s juvenile sentencing jurisprudence and protects
courts from having to make life expectancy determinations.

156. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010).
157. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S 551, 560–61 (2005) (“[W]e have established the propriety and affirmed the necessity of referring to ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society’ to determine which punishments are so disproportionate as to
be cruel and unusual.’” (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–101 (1958)).
158. See supra Part III.

